Dignity, the Eighth Amendment, and the Fourteenth Amendment

Introduction

The word dignity appears in many international resolutions, declarations, and national constitutions. For example, Article 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that “[a]ll human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.”[1] Article 10 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights states that “[a]ll persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person.”[2]

Dignity also appears in constitutions. Article 1 of the German Basic Law[3] states

i)                Human dignity shall be inviolable. To respect and protect it shall be duty of all state authority.

ii)              The German people, therefore, acknowledge inviolable and inalienable human rights as the basis of every community, of peace and of justice in the world.

The Preamble to the Irish Constitution of 1937 states, “We, the people of Éire…seeking to promote the common good, with due observance of Prudence, Justice and Charity, so that the dignity and freedom of the individual may be assured…[d]o hereby adopt, enact and give to ourselves this Constitution.”[4]  Over the years, dignity has become a common justification for the protection of rights and liberties, and legal decision making. This article explores the ways in which the Supreme Court has invoked the different concept of dignity in legal jurisprudence, specifically in its interpretation of the Eighth Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment.


I. A Broad Definition of Dignity

The perception of what dignity means is variable depending on which scholar you circumscribe to. To this end, it “is culturally dependent and eminently malleable.”[5] Although there is no singular universally accepted definition of dignity, generally speaking, dignity may encompass the following concepts.

Dignity entails respect. Kant stated the following:

Every human being has a legitimate claim to respect them from his fellow human beings and is in turn bound to respect every other. Humanity itself is dignity; for human being cannot be used merely as a means by any human being…but must also be used at the same time as an end. It is just in this that his dignity…consists, by which he raises himself above all other beings in the world that are not human beings and yet can be used, and so over all things.[6]

Dignity is grounded in the inherent worth of human being and dignity mandates certain forms of treatment from others. According to Kant, human beings are capable of rational thought and have the capacity to live as autonomous agents. A central part of Kant’s categorical imperative argues that human beings should never be treated as a means to an end and must be treated with respect to their rationality, and their ability to act autonomously. This explanation of dignity encompasses both negative and positive treatment, for example not inflicting certain harm and treating individuals with respect.

International courts, such as the United Kingdom, have treated dignity as synonymous with equal treatment of others. In Ghaidan v. Godin-Mendoza, Baroness Hale stated, “Democracy is founded on the principle that each individual has equal value. Treating some as automatically having less value than others not only causes pain and distress to that person but also violates his or her dignity as a human being.”[7]

There is a close link between dignity and autonomy. The central concept of autonomy is the right to self-determination—an autonomous person has the power to choose how to govern and conduct his own life. Being autonomous means having the freedom to makes choices about one’s future and desires. Dignity encompasses autonomy. Thus, to live a dignified life is to have the capacity and opportunity for self-governance.


II. The Eighth Amendment and Dignity

Although the United States Supreme Court has never expressly recognized dignity as a standalone right and only episodically mentions dignity, dignity has nonetheless played a growing role in United States constitutional interpretation, and in particular with regards to the interpretation of Eighth Amendment. The Supreme Court has invoked the principle of human dignity in deciding its cases concerning the death penalty to decide whether or not the punishment sought is “cruel and unusual” and therefore unconstitutional. The Eighth Amendment states that “[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”[8]

The Supreme Court has often suggested that what is deemed cruel and unusual is an evolving standard. In Wilkerson v. Utah, the Supreme Court appeared to oppose setting a fixed definition of “cruel and unusual” stating, “[d]ifficulty would attend the effort to define with exactness the extent of the constitutional provision which provides that cruel and unusual punishments shall not be inflicted.”[9]

In Trop v. Dulles, the Supreme Court decided that the Amendment “must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of maturing society.”[10] Thus, in the eyes of the Supreme Court, dignity is not a stagnant value but rather a value which takes its meaning from evolving society. Given the absence of a rigid definition of “cruel and unusual” in the Eighth Amendment itself, the Supreme Court has invoked dignity as an underlying principle to decide whether certain punishments constitute “cruel and unusual punishment.”

In many of the Supreme Court cases concerning the Eighth Amendment, the focus on dignity predominantly centers around treating offenders as human beings. First, this recognizes offenders as human beings and second, acknowledges that some punishments are too cruel to impose on human beings despite their wrongdoings. One of the earliest cases concerning the Eighth Amendment and dignity is Trop v. Dulles. In Trop, a private serving in the U.S. Army in French Morocco escaped from a stockade and later returned to the stockade. He applied for a passport and his application was denied on the basis that he had lost citizenship under Section 401(g) of the Nationality Act 1940 for dishonorable discharge for wartime desertion.[11] The Supreme Court found denationalization forbidden under the Eighth Amendment. The Supreme Court stated the following:

The basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man. While the State has the power to punishment, the Amendment stands to assure that this power be exercised within the limits of civilized standards. Fines, imprisonment and even execution may be imposed depending upon the enormity of the crime, but any technique outside the bounds of these traditional penalties is constitutionally suspect.[12]

In another death penalty case, Furman v. Georgia, the Supreme Court held that Georgia’s death penalty statute was unconstitutional based on the fact that it breached the Eighth Amendment’s cruel and unusual punishment clause due to its arbitrary nature.[13] Most notably, Justice Brennan’s concurrence in Furman emphasized the notion that the Eighth Amendment is grounded in the recognition of dignity. In deciding that the extinguishment of human life is a degradation to dignity, Justice Brennan explained that:

The true significance of these punishments is that they treat members of the human race as nonhumans, as objects to be toyed with and discarded. They are thus inconsistent with the fundamental premise of the [Eighth Amendment] that even the vilest criminal remains a human possessed of common human dignity.[14]

In the passage above, Justice Brennan recognized that there exist some forms of punishment that are so inhumane that no one should be punished in that manner. Such punishments are an affront to human dignity. By focusing on individualism, Justice Brennan recognized that the offender is a human being and some punishments, such as the death penalty, are simply too vile to subject to even the most horrendous offenders. In fact, Justice Brennan’s recognition that there are punishments so inhumane that it is inconsistent with dignity is reminiscent of Michael Myer’s observation:

The fact that anyone engages in undignified behavior or fails to have a[n] appropriate sense of dignity gives no individual moral license to treat him – even while he is doing so – as if he has no dignity…it does not provide others with the privilege to treat him like an object or deprive him of the status of a human being.[15]

In Furman, the Supreme Court extrapolated principles recognized from cases, and inherent in the Eighth Amendment, which aid judicial determination of whether a certain punishment is in line with human dignity.[16] The primary principle is that punishment must not be so severe as to be degrading to the dignity of human beings. Barbaric punishments degrade the dignity of human beings. The Supreme Court condemns such punishment not only because of the infliction of physical pain, but

the true significance of these punishments is that they treat members of the human race as nonhumans, as objects to be toyed with and discarded. They are thus inconsistent with the fundamental premise of the [cruel and unusual punishment clause] that even the vilest criminal remains a human being possessed of common human dignity.[17]

The secondary principle is that the State must not arbitrarily inflict severe punishment. To this end, the State does not respect human dignity when it inflicts severe punishment on some, but not others, without reason. This principle protects against the danger of the arbitrary infliction of extremely severe punishments.[18] The third principle is that the severe punishment must not be unacceptable to contemporary society. This is judged from an objective basis. In order to assess whether the severe punishment is acceptable to contemporary society, the judicial task is to review the history of the punishment and to examine society’s current practices with respect to the use of that punishment.[19] The last principle is that the severe punishment must not be excessive. The Supreme Court stated that a “punishment is excessive under this principle if it is unnecessary: the infliction of a severe punishment by the State cannot comport with human dignity when it is nothing more than the pointless infliction of suffering.”[20] In deciding whether a severe punishment is excessive, the court is to consider whether the punishment serves penal purpose more effectively than a less severe punishment.[21]

The Supreme Court’s understanding and use of dignity is centered around the notion that individuals may be said to possess dignity even if they themselves do not act in a dignified manner. There is a moral realization that criminals’ undignified behavior does not justify the justice system to treat them as if they do not have dignity. Treating individuals as nonhumans and subjecting them to degradation is inconsistent with the premise of the Eighth Amendment.


III. The Fourteenth Amendment and Dignity

The Supreme Court has recognized dignity when it comes to the Fourteenth Amendment and decisions about privacy. The principle of autonomy is central to the definition of dignity in such cases, especially when it comes to private matters such as abortion and sexuality. The Supreme Court recognizes that states should not interfere with decisions that are central to personal dignity and autonomy.

In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,[22] the Supreme Court affirmed the decision in Roe v. Wade[23] that a person retains the right to have an abortion but may ban the abortion of a viable fetus except where the health of the mother is at risk. The Supreme Court stated:

Our law affords constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing and education . . . These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of personhood were they formed under compulsion of the State.[24]

This opinion clarifies that some rights, such as those mentioned in the opinion, are so personal and intimate that they have implied ties with dignity. The court recognized the relationship between dignity and autonomy. In fact, the court stated, “[p]art of the constitutional liberty to choose is the equal dignity to which each of us is entitled. A woman who decides to terminate her pregnancy is entitled to the same respect as a woman who decides to carry the fetus to term.”[25] Justice Stevens opined that there is a close relationship between dignity and privacy. “The woman’s constitutional liberty interest also involves her freedom to decide matters of the highest privacy and the most personal nature . . . The authority to make such traumatic and yet empowering decisions is an element of basic human dignity.”[26]

Dignity played an important role in Lawrence v. Texas, where the Supreme Court invalidated a law prohibiting sodomy.[27] In Lawrence, the Supreme Court emphasized the autonomy of individuals to choose their partners and moreover the autonomy to make choices about their sexuality. The Court held that the liberty protected by the Constitution allows homosexual persons the right to choose to enter upon relationships in their own private lives and still retain their dignity as free persons. According to the Supreme Court, the Constitution affords individuals the liberty to make choices regarding sexuality. Individuals have autonomy when it comes to matters central to personal dignity. The state cannot interfere with such intimate sexual choices of individuals, nor can it condemn such choices.


Conclusion

The discussion above details the different ways in which dignity has found its way into American constitutional law. Dignity is not a freestanding constitutional right. Indeed, Justice Thomas stated that “the Constitution contains no ‘dignity’ Clause.”[28] Dignity, however, is a constitutional value. Constitutional values are ideas which form relations between the individual and the state and underlie the common law.[29] Because dignity is a value and not a right, there are no legal conditions that automatically follow if the value of dignity is not met. Constitutional values such as dignity provide guidelines for the state and aid in the interpretation of a right. Thus, although dignity appears to be a value instead of a right in American jurisprudence, dignity is nonetheless an important value used by the Supreme Court to interpret the Constitution.


 [1] G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. I (Dec. 10, 1948).


[2] International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. X, opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force March 23, 1976).


[3] Grundgesetz [GG] [Constitution] art. 1 (F.R.G.).


[4] Constitution of Ireland 1937 preamble.


[5] David Feldman, Human Dignity as a Legal Value Part 1, Pub. L. 682-702 (1999).


[6] Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals 209 (Mary J. Gregor trans. & ed., Cambridge Univ. Press, 1996).


[7] Ghaidan v. Godin-Mendoza, [2004] UKHL 30.


[8] U.S. Const. amend. VIII.


[9] Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 135–36 (1878).


[10] Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).


[11] Id.


[12] Id. at 100.


[13] Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).


[14] Id. at 273  (Brennan, J., concurring).


[15] Michael J. Meyer, Dignity, Rights, and Self-Control, 99 Ethics 520, 529(1989).


[16] Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 408 (1972).


[17]  Ibid.


[18] Ibid.


[19] Ibid.


[20] Ibid.


[21] Ibid.


[22] Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).


[23] Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973).


[24] Casey, 505 U.S. at 851,


[25] Id. at 920.


[26] Id. at 915.


[27] Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).


[28] Obergefell v. Hodges, 567 U.S. 644 (2015).


[29] Philip Sales, Constitutional Values in the Common Law of Obligations, 83 Cambridge L.J. 132 (2024).